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PUSHING THE LIMITS: REINING IN OHIO’S
RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS FOR SEX
OFFENDERS
TAUREAN J. SHATTUCK*
ABSTRACT
The danger to children posed by convicted sex offenders living near schools,
parks, and bus stops has been greatly exaggerated by the media. In turn, many state
legislatures have attempted to find solutions to this perceived problem, imposing
sanctions that seem to keep the “problem” at bay. A relatively new approach
prevents those convicted of sex crimes from living within a certain distance of places
where children congregate. Ohio is one of the states that has adopted this approach.
The problem with this approach, however, is that imposing such restrictions on all
individuals convicted of certain crimes imposes barriers to treatment and arguably
infringes upon their constitutional rights, while the efficacy of the sanctions is not
backed by research data. Despite the lack of empirical support, legislatures have
continued to enact tougher new laws on sex offenders. If the Ohio legislature really
wanted to effectuate their goal of protecting children from dangerous sex offenders,
it would allow the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether residency
restrictions would be proper. This is an approach taken by a growing number of
states that takes into account research findings on sex offenders and recidivism, as
well as addresses some of the constitutional concerns of the offenders. This Note
argues for this policy shift in Ohio by examining the current approach and how the
issue is evolving throughout the country.
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I. INTRODUCTION

“We shall act, and we shall act with good intentions. Hopefully, we will often be
right, but at times, we will be wrong. When we are, let us admit it and immediately
try to right the situation.”1
Laws governing sex offenders, though enacted with benevolence, are ineffective
as currently construed and may exacerbate the problem.2 When crafting policies to
regulate sex offenders, legislatures turn to scare tactics rather than rely on research
data.3
Following a few highly publicized murders, states enacted residency restriction
statutes to prevent convicted sex offenders from living within certain distances of
schools, playgrounds, daycare centers, and other places where children often
congregate.4 However, studies show that these statutes are not effective in reducing
recidivism.5 Additionally, some courts hold that these statutes are unconstitutional. 6
This Note argues that Ohio’s approach to residency restrictions has gone too far.
Ohio needs a system that gives individual judges discretion in imposing restrictions
efficaciously.
Ohio law imposes residency restrictions on individuals convicted of sex
offenses.7 Depending on the underlying conviction, the offender is classified in one
of three tiers.8 These tiers categorize crimes based on their nature and severity.9 The
applicable tier determines whether he will have to register as a sex offender for a
specified period of time. 10 However, placement into these tiers does not account for

1

Joe Paterno, Commencement Speech at Penn State University (June 16, 1973).

2

See Eric Tennen, Risky Policies: How Effective Are Restrictions on Sex Offenders in
Reducing Reoffending?, 58 BOSTON B.J. 1 (2014).
3

Christina Mancini, Sex Offender Residence Restriction Laws: Parental Perceptions and
Public Policy, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 1022, 1024 (2010).
4

Karen Terry, Sex Offender Laws in the United States: Smart Policy or Disproportionate
Sanctions?, 39 INT’L J. COMP. APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 113, 116 (2015).
5

Jason Rydberg et al., The Effect of Statewide Residency Restrictions on Sex Offender PostRelease Housing Mobility, 31 JUST. Q. 421, 422 (2012).
6

Terry, supra note 4, at 116.

7

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034 (West 2016).

8

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01, 2950.031.

9

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01.

10

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.04.
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whether the offender is likely to reoffend.11 Additionally, Ohio law prohibits anyone
convicted of a crime requiring registry as a sex offender from living within 1,000
feet of any school, preschool, or daycare center.12 This restriction is imposed
regardless of the tier in which an offender is classified.13
Many litigants raised constitutional arguments against Ohio’s statutory scheme
for sex offenders.14 Some of these attacks were successful.15 For instance, the Ohio
Supreme Court recently held that residency restrictions cannot be applied to
offenders who were convicted of sex offenses prior to the enactment of the residency
restriction statute in 2003 and the amendments in 2007. 16 However, offenders were
unsuccessful in arguing that residency restrictions are unconstitutional violations of
the Due Process Clause.17 The Ohio Supreme Court explained that the restrictions do
not implicate a fundamental right; therefore, the restrictions are constitutional
because they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.18
This Note further argues that Ohio’s approach to imposing residency restrictions
on a blanket basis needs to be revised to only apply to sex offenders who pose the
highest risk to the public. Based on the results of research studies and recent court
decisions in different states,19 this Note shows that the application of residency
restrictions on a blanket basis is ineffective and undermines the state’s interest in
protecting children. Moreover, Ohio’s residency restrictions do not pass the rational
basis test, which is currently used to determine whether the state’s legitimate interest
overrides the offenders’ rights.20
Part II of this Note discusses the background of residency restrictions for sex
offenders throughout the country. This section highlights the history of legislation
regarding sex offenders and the historical judicial treatment of residency restrictions
for sex offenders. Part III of this Note examines the arguments for and against the
use of residency restrictions for sex offenders. This section starts with studies that
provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of residency restrictions for sex offenders.
This section also provides an argument in favor of residency restrictions in a more
targeted manner. Parts IV and V of this Note describe recent state action on
residency restrictions for sex offenders, including how Ohio approaches these
residency restrictions. Finally, Part VI of this Note concludes with a
11

See Margaret Troia, Ohio’s Sex Offender Residency Restriction Law: Does It Protect the
Health and Safety of the State’s Children or Falsely Make People Believe So?, 19 J.L. &
HEALTH 331, 334 (2005).
12

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034.

13

See Troia, supra note 11.

14

See generally In re Bruce, 983 N.E.2d 350 (Ohio 2012); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108
(Ohio 2011); State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 2010); O’Brien v. Hill, 965 N.E.2d 1050
(Ohio Ct. App. 2012).
15

See generally Bruce, 983 N.E.2d 350; Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753.

16

See Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108.

17

O’Brien, 965 N.E.2d 1050.

18

Id. at 1054.

19

In re Taylor, 343 P.3d 867 (Cal. 2015).

20

O’Brien, 965 N.E.2d 1050.
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recommendation on how Ohio should manage residency restrictions for sex
offenders that will better effectuate its goal of protecting its citizens’ safety.
II. BACKGROUND ON TREATMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS
A. History of Legislation Regarding Sex Offenders
Legislation regarding sex crimes increased in the 1990s although instances of sex
crime decreased.21 Some scholars suggest that increased media attention on a few
high-profile crimes was the root cause for the increase in legislation.22 In short, the
increased media exposure gave the public a false impression that sex crimes were on
the rise, so the public demanded that action be taken to combat the perceived spike
in crime.23 State legislatures quickly responded to the pressure from both the general
public and the federal government. 24 Focusing on the need to protect children,
legislators passed laws regulating sex offenders without the support of much
empirical research and relied upon the heightened perception of danger.25
The increase in legislation regarding sex offenders began with the murders of
several children.26 In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (“Jacob Wetterling Act”).27
21

Bianca Easterly, Playing Politics with Sex Offender Laws: An Event History Analysis of the
Initial Community Notification Laws Across American States, 43 POL’Y STUD. J. 355 (2014);
see also Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions: Are There Any
Limits?, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17 (2008) (reporting that between
1992 and 2000, substantiated child sexual abuse cases decreased from 150,000 to 89,500, or
by approximately 40%).
22

See Easterly, supra note 21.

23

Id. at 355 (“The media’s role in disseminating information about and entertaining the public
with crime stories significantly heightened public fear of crime in the 1990s.”).
24

Id.

25

Id. at 359.
Recognizing the political opportunity that adopting sex offender laws presented, states
hastily adopted some version of [sex offender registration and notification] legislation
before federal intervention, naming many of the laws after the young victims such as
‘Megan’s Law.’ Social constructionists would explain this behavior as a political
opportunity for elected officials to demonize sex offenders further while reminding
the public of their interest in protecting children as a way to ensure a substantial
political payoff.

Id.; see also Mancini, supra note 3, at 1024 (“[M]any federal and state legislative reforms
have been named in honor of sexually victimized and murdered children . . . a development
that has led . . . to the erroneous perception that ‘many, if not most, sex offenders go on to
kill.’”).
26

See Easterly, supra note 21, at 356 (“[I]t is commonly believed that extensive media
attention to the tragic murders of Jacob Wetterling, Polly Klaas, Megan Kanka, and other
children in the 1980s and early 1990s led to the most recent wave of sex offender laws.”); see
also Wright, supra note 21.
27

Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: Successful Integration
or Exclusion?, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 169, 169 (2014) (“[The Act] required states to
track sex offenders’ places of residence annually for 10 years after their release into the
community (and quarterly for the rest of their lives if they were violent).”); see also Daniel J.
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The Jacob Wetterling Act created two components that impacted sex offenders:
registration and community notification.28 The legislation established a national sex
offender registry and required states to submit sex offender information, conviction
data, and fingerprints to the FBI.29 The community notification portion of the Jacob
Wetterling Act allowed states to release sex offender information to the public.30
Congress gave states three years to implement the components of the Jacob
Wetterling Act, threatening to withhold federal funding for failure to comply. 31 The
Jacob Wetterling Act was somewhat discretionary for local law enforcement
agencies.32 Police departments were not required to notify the community about the
“presence and location of sex offenders.” 33
In 1996, Congress amended the Jacob Wetterling Act because it determined that
increased disclosure of sex offender registration information was important for the
public’s protection.34 This amendment, which became known as “Megan’s Law,”
requires law enforcement authorities to make information available to the public
regarding registered sex offenders.”35 The federal Megan’s Law amendment to the
Jacob Wetterling Act was similar to the original state version of Megan’s Law that
was initially enacted in New Jersey. 36 In any event, the Megan’s Law amendment to

Schubert, Challenging Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act: Senate Bill 10 Blurs the Line Between
Punishment and Remedial Treatment of Sex Offenders, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 277, 280
(2010) (“[T]he Jacob Wetterling Act mandated that all states enact laws requiring offenders
convicted of offenses ‘against a minor or a sexually violent offense to register a current
address with state or local authorities.’”).
28

Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and
Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 94 (1996).
29

Id. at 95; see also Schubert, supra note 27, at 280 (“Under the Jacob Wetterling Act, the
length of registration was determined by the ‘previous number of convictions, the nature of
the offense, and the characterization of the offender as a sexual predator.’”).
30

Lewis, supra note 28, at 95.

31

See Wright, supra note 21, at 29.

32

Id. at 30.

33

Id.

34

Kristen M. Zgoba, Residence Restriction Buffer Zones and the Banishment of Sex
Offenders: Have We Gone One Step Too Far?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 391, 392
(2011).
[Megan Kanka’s murder], as well as others, alerted Congress that some law
enforcement agencies were not exercising their discretion to notify communities of
sex offenders living in the area, leading to inconsistent community notification
standards. In response, Congress amended the Jacob Wetterling Act in 1996, which
abolished law enforcement discretion and imposed an affirmative duty on law
enforcement agencies to release sex offender registration information.
Schubert, supra note 27, at 281.
35

Id. at 393; see also Easterly, supra note 21, at 356.

36

Koresh A. Avrahamian, A Critical Perspective: Do “Megan’s Laws” Really Shield
Children From Sex-Predators?, 19 J. JUV. L. 301, 302 (1998); see also Daniel M. Filler,
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the Jacob Wetterling Act received nearly unanimous support having been enacted in
some version by all fifty states and the District of Columbia.37 President Clinton
later stated the following in support of Megan’s Law:
Nothing is more important than keeping our children safe. We have taken
decisive steps to help families protect their children, especially from sex
offenders, people who according to study after study are likely to commit
their crimes again and again. We’ve all read too many tragic stories about
young people victimized by repeat offenders. That’s why in the crime bill
we required every state in the country to compile a registry of sex
offenders, and gave states the power to notify communities about child
sex offenders and violent sex offenders that move into their
neighborhoods.38
A decade later, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Act, which “enhanced sex
offender registration and notification requirements, expanded the duration of the sex
offender registration, and increased penalties for sex offenders who fail to register.” 39
The Adam Walsh Act “increase[d] mandatory sentences for federal sex offenders,
civil commitment of sex offenders, criminal information record checks, child
pornography investigative and prosecutorial resources, require[d] the creation of a
national child abuse registry, and provide[d] grant funding for implementation.”40 It
also created a classification system for sex offenders, which included three tiers into
which different sex crimes would fall,41 and mandated that sex offenders register for
a specified period of time.42
Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 315
(2001) (“Within days of [Megan Kanka’s] death, Megan’s parents . . . began a campaign to
pressure the New Jersey legislature to adopt a sex-offender community-notification law in her
memory. Their plea was personal and explicitly tied to the death of their daughter.”).
37

Zgoba, supra note 34, at 392-93; see also Avrahamian, supra note 36, at 303.

38

Maureen S. Hopbell, Balancing the Protection of Children Against the Protection of
Constitutional Rights: The Past, Present, and Future of Megan’s Law, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 331,
338-39 (2004) (quoting President Clinton’s Weekly Radio Address, CNN, June 22, 1996).
39

Zgoba, supra note 34, at 393; see also Mustaine, supra note 27, at 170 (stating that the
Adam Walsh Act also “created the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring,
Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking to oversee the implementation and maintenance of
federal sex offender policy”); Schubert, supra note 27, at 282 (“[T]he Adam Walsh Act
requires those law enforcement agencies to ‘make sex offenders’ information accessible to
anyone with the click of a button.’”).
40

Wright, supra note 21, at 31.

41

Id. at 32.

42

Id.
Tier I offenders must register for fifteen years, tier II offenders for twenty-five years,
and tier III offenders for life. Offenders who do not re-offend for a minimum of ten
years may reduce the length of time that they must register. There is no provision for
an offender to be removed from the registries prior to those minimum dates. Offenders
are required to allow the jurisdiction to verify their addresses and take a current
photograph of them: each year if they are a tier I offender, every six months if they are
a tier II offender, and every three months if they are a tier III offender.
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Another legislative measure taken to protect the public was the enactment of
residency restrictions for individuals convicted of sex offenses.43 Florida was the
first state to implement statewide residency restrictions in 1995.44 Currently, more
than thirty states impose residency restrictions on sex offenders.45 Residency
restrictions vary from state to state in their specific distances and zones excluded. 46
The intent behind residency restrictions was to keep children safe by prohibiting
sexual offenders from being in areas where children normally congregate. 47 This
concept is derived from routine activity theory. 48 In reference to sex offenders, the
routine activity theory
posits that if potential sex offenders are not in close proximity to suitable
targets (i.e., children), they will not have opportunities to commit these
crimes, even in the absence of capable guardians (e.g., teachers, parents,
coaches, neighbors, etc.). Therefore, policies on residential restrictions
assume that these restrictions stop sex offenders from living in restricted
areas, and that post release community correctional officers can regularly
check on and ensure that sex offenders comply with their restrictions.49
Residency restrictions for sex offenders are based upon the assumption that
“most sex offenders meet their victims by going to nearby child congregation
locations, loitering around, and gaining access to these young strangers by
Id.
43

Mustaine, supra note 27, at 170.

44

Zgoba, supra note 34, at 393.

45

John Kip Cornwell, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: Government Regulation of Public
Health, Safety, and Morality, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 7 (2015) (“In addition, several
states allow municipalities within them to enact their own restrictions, either in lieu of or in
addition to statewide regulation.”); see also Mancini, supra note 3, at 1023.
46

Mustaine, supra note 27, at 170. (“These types of restrictions typically include prohibitions
from living and loitering closer to various child congregation locations (e.g., schools, parks,
daycare centers, etc.) than a legally specified distance (e.g., 500-1000 feet).”); see also Zgoba,
supra note 34, at 393.
47

Richard Tewksbury, Evidence of Ineffectiveness: Advancing the Argument Against Sex
Offender Residence Restrictions, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 135, 135 (2014) [hereinafter
Tewksbury, Evidence of Ineffectiveness] (explaining that the logic of such restrictions is built
upon public safety – if sex offenders do not reside within sight or easy walking distance of
places children gather, then those children will be spared sexual victimization); see also
Mancini, supra note 3, at 1023 (“Residence restriction laws were heralded by lawmakers as a
‘reasonable endeavor in helping parents protect their children.’”).
48

Mustaine, supra note 27, at 170; see also Richard Tewksbury et al., Examining Rates of
Sexual Offenses from a Routine Activities Perspective, 3 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 75, 77 (2008)
[hereinafter Tewksbury et al., Examining Rates of Sexual Offenses] (“Routine activities theory
was originally introduced by Cohen & Felson (1979), who believed that crime rates were
influenced by the daily routines of individuals. Specifically, they believed that the
convergence of (1) a potential offender, (2) a suitable target, and (3) ineffective or absent
guardianship allowed for the necessary conditions to be present for a predatory crime to
occur.”).
49

Id.
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manipulation and coercion.”50 Despite the empirical evidence dispelling this
assumption,51 many jurisdictions have increased the use of residency restrictions for
sex offenders.52 Some states increased the use of residency restrictions as a
reactionary measure to prevent the state from becoming a haven for sex offenders
fleeing neighboring states with more restrictive laws. 53
As explained above, the proliferation of laws regulating the treatment of sex
offenders has increased in recent history. 54 These laws have increased because
legislators do not fear backlash from their constituency for getting “tough” against
sex offenders.55 The increase in sex offender legislation is also partly caused by the
way the courts have traditionally treated residency restrictions for sex offenders.56
B. Historical Judicial Treatment of Residency Restrictions
Residency restrictions for sex offenders have faced many constitutional
challenges over the years.57 Most constitutional challenges to residency restrictions
implicate ex post facto laws or substantive due process challenges. 58 Courts
traditionally strike down ex post facto challenges “because the punitive effects of the
statute [imposing residency restrictions for sex offenders] do not override the
legitimate legislative intent to enact a non-punitive, civil, non-excessive regulatory
measure to promote child safety.” 59
Similarly, courts rule against substantive due process challenges “by finding that
the laws rationally advance a legitimate government purpose to protect children by
reducing the opportunity and temptation convicted offenders with high recidivism
rates face near schools.”60 As one scholar noted, “[substantive due process
c]hallenges are difficult to sustain, however, because of the Court’s unwillingness to
expand protections beyond traditional fundamental interests.” 61 Because sex
offenders have not been able to assert rights that courts deem fundamental, residency
50

Id.

51

See Mancini, supra note 3, at 1024.

52

Zgoba, supra note 34, at 393.

53

Id.; see also Wright, supra note 21, at 44-45.

54

See supra Section II.A.

55

See Megan A. Janicki, Note, Better Seen Than Herded: Residency Restrictions and Global
Positioning System Tracking Laws for Sex Offenders, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 285, 287 (2007)
(“No one ever lost votes going after sex offenders.”).
56

See infra Section II.B.

57

See Troia, supra note 11, at 350.

58

Id. at 350-55.

59

Id. at 350.

60

Id. at 351.

61

Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex
Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1123 (2012) (“[T]he Court has held firm
to the proposition that the right asserted must be ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
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restrictions only need to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to be
upheld.62
The highest court to hear a case regarding residency restrictions for sex offenders
imposed by a state legislature was the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 63 In Doe v.
Miller, the court upheld the constitutionality of an Iowa statute that imposed a
residency restriction prohibiting persons convicted of particular sex offenses
involving minors from residing within 2,000 feet of a school or child-care facility.64
The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute because no fundamental rights
were violated and the residency restriction rationally advanced the state’s legitimate
interest in promoting safety for children.65 The class of sex offenders claimed that
Iowa’s residency restriction statute violated the “right to privacy and choice in
family matters, the right to travel, and the fundamental right to live where you
want.”66 The court held that the statute did not restrict those who may live with the
sex offender67 and did not restrict a sex offender from traveling to 68 or within the
state;69 the court determined the statute simply restricted where the sex offender can
live. The court also concluded that there was not a fundamental right to “live where
you want.”70
After finding that the statute did not violate any fundamental rights, the court
then used the rational basis test to determine whether the statute “rationally advanced
some legitimate governmental purpose.”71 The court determined that the Iowa
legislature had a legitimate concern with the risks posed by sex offenders 72 and that
restricting where the sex offenders could live was a rational means to pursue the
State’s legitimate interest.73 To support this determination, the court stated that
62

Id. (“Legislation that interferes with a fundamental right or liberty will survive
constitutional scrutiny only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Without a fundamental interest to anchor the inquiry, legislation will be deemed constitutional
if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”).
63

Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).

64

Id. at 704-05.

65

Id. at 710-16.

66

Id. at 709.

67

Id. at 710.

68

Id. at 712.

69

Id. at 713.

70

Id. at 714. The court, relying on prior case law, reasoned that the right was not fundamental,
and the court noted that the appellees did not even argue that the right is “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. (citing
Prostrollo v. Univ. of S.D., 507 F.2d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 1974)) (“We cannot agree that the
right to choose one’s place of residence is necessarily a fundamental right.”).
71

Id. at 714 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)).

72

Id. (“There can be no doubt of a legislature’s rationality in believing that ‘sex offenders are
a serious threat in this nation,’ and that ‘when convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are
much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-arrested for a new rape or sexual
assault.’”) (quoting Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003)).
73

Id. at 716.
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“[s]ex offenders have a high rate of recidivism, and the parties presented expert
testimony that reducing the opportunity and temptation is important to minimizing
the risk of reoffense.”74 It then continued to state that “it is the state legislature’s job
to judge the best means to protect the health and welfare of its citizens ‘in an area
where precise statistical data is unavailable and human behavior is necessarily
unpredictable.’”75
The Doe court also ruled against the sex offenders’ procedural due process
claims.76 The offenders claimed that the Iowa residency restriction statute was
unconstitutional because the statutory scheme did not have a separate process to
determine the level of dangerousness to society that each individual offender
posed.77 Rejecting their claim, the court stated that
[t]he restriction applies to all offenders who have been convicted of
certain crimes against minors, regardless of what estimates of future
dangerousness might be proved in individualized hearings. Once such a
legislative classification has been drawn, additional procedures are
unnecessary, because the statute does not provide a potential exemption
for individuals who seek to prove they are not individually dangerous or
likely offend against neighboring schoolchildren. 78
Doe v. Miller, the case heard by the highest court thus far regarding residency
restrictions, has been used by other courts as precedent for determining the
constitutionality of residency restriction statutes. 79 For example, it was used in Ohio
to show that the statutes imposing residency restrictions for sex offenders did not
violate the offenders’ substantive due process rights.80
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE USE OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS FOR
SEX OFFENDERS
A. Studies Showing the Ineffectiveness of Residency Restrictions
The main goal for legislatures enacting residency restrictions against sex
offenders is to protect children. 81 However, studies show that residency restrictions
are not effective in achieving this goal. 82 The theoretical premise behind residency
restrictions is that if sex offenders are prohibited from residing near children, they
are unlikely to have the opportunity to reoffend; thus, sex offender recidivism is
74

Id.

75

See Troia, supra note 11, at 353 (quoting Doe, 405 F.3d at 714).

76

Doe, 405 F.3d at 709.

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Wright, supra note 21, at 42.

80

State ex rel. O’Brien v. Heimlich, 2009-Ohio-1550, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.).

81

Tewksbury, Evidence of Ineffectiveness, supra note 47; see also Zgoba, supra note 34, at
394.
82

Tewksbury, Evidence of Ineffectiveness, supra note 47; see also Zgoba, supra note 34, at
394.
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reduced.83 However, during the period where sex offender legislation was on the
rise,84 evidence shows that “sex offenders were the least likely to reoffend.”85
Additionally, studies that were conducted to determine whether the residency
restrictions actually reduce recidivism rates show “no statistically significant
relationship between proximity to schools . . . and sex offender recidivism.”86
One researcher noted that “residence restrictions are based on the assumption that
if offenders live farther away from schools, daycares, and so on, they are unable or
unlikely to access such locations.”87 However, as Judge Kuehn of the Appellate
Court of Illinois, Fifth District, pointed out in People v. Leroy,
[i]nnocent children . . . frolicking upon playgrounds, within eyeshot of
some child sex offender, remain every bit the temptation that they present
to child sex offenders at large, regardless of where those offenders live.
Simply put, the statutory [residency] restriction is pointless. It is a
mindless effort that does nothing to prevent any child sex offender intent
on reoffending from doing so.88
Alternatively, studies show that residency restrictions have a negative effect on
the sex offenders themselves.89 Evidence shows “neighborhoods that were open to
sex offenders (that is, they fall outside the legal residential restrictions) had fewer
available rentals, rentals were less affordable, and were likely located in more rural
locations.”90 With residency restrictions in place, sex offenders have reduced access
to treatment, often live apart from family, and, in many cases, end up being
homeless.91 Some studies even suggest that the instability caused by residency
restrictions may lead to an increased likelihood of reoffending, 92 contrary to the
goals of the restrictions. Additionally, studies show that when residency restrictions

83

Mustaine, supra note 27, at 170. Mustaine disagrees with this theoretical basis by stating that
“[a]lthough routine activity theory is an empirically valid theory for many crimes, it is
apparently not useful for sex offenses and offenders.” Id.
84

See Easterly, supra note 21, at 359 (stating that regulations on sex offenders increased
dramatically after the mid-1990s).
85

Id. at 358; see also Wright, supra note 21, at 26.

86

Mancini, supra note 3, at 1024.

87

Richard Tewksbury, Policy Implications of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions Laws, 10
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 345, 346 (2011) [hereinafter Tewksbury, Policy Implications].
88

Troia, supra note 11, at 347 (quoting People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005)).
89

See Rydberg et al., supra note 5, at 422; see also Tewksbury, Policy Implications, supra
note 87, at 345; Zgoba, supra note 34, at 395 (“[A] great deal of research has indicated that
residence restrictions yield contrary results and maintain collateral consequences that may
lead to increased offending.”).
90

Mustaine, supra note 27, at 172.

91

Zgoba, supra note 34, at 395; see also Wright, supra note 21, at 43.

92

Zgoba, supra note 34, at 395.
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are expanded in distance (e.g. 1,000 to 2,500 feet), entire jurisdictions, such as cities
and towns, may be excluded as options for sex offenders looking for a place to live. 93
Statutory schemes that impose residency restrictions need to be reformed.94
Evidence shows that residency restrictions are ineffective in achieving state
legislatures’ goals95 and negatively impact sex offenders.96
B. Advocacy for the Targeted Use of Residency Restrictions
Although evidence exists that shows the ineffectiveness of residency restrictions,
states continue to utilize them as collateral consequences for convicted sex
offenders.97 One scholar advocated for the use of residency restrictions for sex
offenders who present a high-risk of danger to the community. 98 In his article, John
Cornwell identified the source of states’ power to impose residency restrictions,
provided an explanation of how the restrictions fit within that power, identified some
of the flaws of their restrictions, and discussed how limiting the application of the
restrictions should be the primary focus.99
Cornwell posited that states that impose residency restrictions on individuals who
are convicted of sexual offenses are using “police power to protect public health,
safety, and morality.”100 The Supreme Court upheld this use of police power, which
stems from the Tenth Amendment.101 Cornwell then compared the dangers presented
to the public by sex offenders with a plague, giving the states justification for
quarantining sex offenders.102 Using this justification, Cornwell discussed a history
of cases in which the Supreme Court upheld states’ use of quarantine to protect
public safety and health.103
93

Mustaine, supra note 27, at 174.

94

Id. at 170 (“It is evident that the emotional and political components involved in sex
offender policy development do not produce legislation that is solidly based on the empirical
evidence emerging from the relevant scientific community.”).
95

Tewksbury et al., Examining Rates of Sexual Offenses, supra note 48, at 76.

96

Zgoba, supra note 34, at 395; see also Mustaine, supra note 27, at 173 (“When sex
offenders experience these difficult collateral consequences as a result of residential
restrictions, they are not likely to reintegrate successfully back into the community.”).
97

Cornwell, supra note 45, at 6.

98

Id. at 15.

99

See id.

100

Id. at 5.

101

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991).

102

Cornwell, supra note 45, at 20.

103

Id. (discussing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (upholding civil
commitment of sexually violent predators); see also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
582-83 (1975) (upholding civil commitment of mentally ill persons for purposes other than
treatment) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S.
270, 276-77 (1940) (upholding psychiatric detention of individuals with “psychopathic
personalities”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 11-12 (1905) (upholding
compulsory vaccinations of persons for the prevention of smallpox)). These cases show how
the Supreme Court has upheld the quarantine of individuals for the sake of the health and
safety of the public. Id.
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After identifying the source of states’ power to impose residency restrictions and
explaining how these restrictions on sex offenders fit within the states’ power,
Cornwell identified various flaws with the residency restrictions imposed on sex
offenders.104 He provided evidence that “over-inclusive restrictions may actually
reduce public safety by driving sex offenders underground where they cannot be
monitored by correctional and mental health agencies.” 105 He also stated that overinclusive residency restrictions “overwhelm the system and force governments to
make choices for financial reasons that may undermine public safety.” 106
Despite these flaws, Cornwell argued that focusing residency restrictions on the
most dangerous sex offenders was sound policy. 107 He noted that there were states,
such as Iowa, whose sex offender statutes differentiated high-risk and low-risk
offenders.108 Cornwell explained that “[f]ocusing residency restrictions on a smaller
group of high-risk sex offenders is consistent . . . with data on recidivism.”109 After
highlighting that there is a small subset of sex offenders who do have certain
characteristics that render them a danger to society, Cornwell said that “[t]argeting
individuals based on . . . identifiable high-risk factors makes far more sense than
arbitrary reliance on factors such as parolee status in making statutory enforcement
decisions.”110
Other scholars have argued in favor of residency restrictions for sex offenders 111
because these restrictions make the public and policy-makers feel like they are doing
something to combat to sex offenders.112 For instance, one scholar noted that “[t]he
community has a right to both feel and live safely from sexually violent offenders,

104

See Cornwell, supra note 45, at 1.

105

Id. at 14.

106

Id. at 15.

107

Id. at 35.

108

Id. at 15.

109

Id.

110

Id. at 16; see also Mustaine, supra note 27, at 174.
As noted, sex offenders are not all the same. Some are older; others are younger. Some
have child victims; others have adult victims (and still others have both). Some were
involved in consensual relations with victims, but the victims were under age; others
were coercive and forceful with victims. Some offenders are juveniles or had families
with whom they lived and must return to these families when they are released; others
are less attached adults and must find their own housing. Some sex offenders have
more financial resources and can afford the scarce housing that does not fall into
restricted zones; others are destitute and end up homeless. Thinking that any one
policy could effectively service all of these offenders borders on ridiculous.

Id.
111

Tewksbury, Evidence of Effectiveness, supra note 47.

112

Id. (“[R]esidency restrictions offer the positive of symbolic value, which may be possessed
by both policy makers and society in general (as such policies may be a ‘means of fortifying
solidarity’ against the socially undesirable).”); see also Zgoba, supra note 34, at 394
(“[Residency restrictions] simply make sense to lawmakers and the public.”).
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and policy makers are well intentioned in their efforts to bring this sentiment to
fruition.”113
IV. RECENT STATE ACTION ON RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS FOR SEX OFFENDERS
Recent state action in reference to residency restrictions for sex offenders has
shown that traditional views on the statutory approaches to the restrictions may be
changing.114
A. California’s Approach to Residency Restrictions
The California Supreme Court recently struck down the state’s blanket use of
residency restrictions as unconstitutional. 115 In doing so, the California Supreme
Court became the first state supreme court to strike down residency restrictions for
sex offenders as violations of substantive due process.116 Within In re Taylor, sex
offenders claimed that residency restrictions imposed upon them by the State of
California were “unconstitutionally unreasonable” under the due process clause. 117
The trial court ultimately agreed and held:
[T]he blanket application of the residency restrictions violates [the sex
offenders’] constitutional rights by denying them access to nearly all
rental housing in the county that would otherwise be available to them,
and as a direct consequence, has caused a great many of them to become
homeless, and has further denied them reasonable access to medical and
psychological treatment resources, drug and alcohol dependency services,
job counseling, and other social services to which parolees are entitled by
law.118
The appellate court and Supreme Court of California subsequently upheld the trial
court’s conclusions.119
As the sex offenders alleged that the residency restrictions infringed on their
substantive due process rights, the court had to determine whether the rights
allegedly infringed upon were fundamental.120 The sex offenders specifically alleged
that the restrictions infringed upon the “rights to intrastate travel, to establish and
maintain a home, and to privacy and free association with others within one’s
113

Zgoba, supra note 34, at 396.

114

See discussion infra Section V.

115

In re Taylor, 343 P.3d 867 (Cal. 2015). California’s residency restrictions were enacted in
the Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law. Id. at 869. The residency
restrictions prevented sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a public or private school,
or a park where children regularly gather. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5(b) (2006)).
116

Cornwell, supra note 45, at 16-17.

117

Taylor, 343 P.3d at 877.

118

Id.

119

Id. at 869.

120

Id. at 878 (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause ‘forbids the government to
infringe . . . fundamental liberty interests in any manner’ unless the infringement is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”).
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home.”121 The court discussed that the level of review would depend on whether the
rights claimed by the sex offenders were fundamental; it would be strict scrutiny if
the rights were fundamental, and it would be rational basis if the rights were not
fundamental.122
The court in Taylor stated that it did not need to decide whether strict scrutiny or
rational basis review applied because the blanket residency restrictions for sex
offenders could not even survive the rational basis review. 123 The court pointed out
both the harsh and severe restrictions and the disabilities on liberty and privacy
rights.124 The court also discussed how the residency restrictions hampered efforts to
monitor, supervise, and rehabilitate sex offenders, which ran contrary to what the
restrictions were designed to accomplish. 125 The court held that the residency
restrictions bore no rational relationship to advancing the state’s legitimate goal of
protecting children from sexual predators.126
Additionally, the respondents in In re Taylor argued that the sex offenders do not
have the same protections as the general public while they are on parole.127 The court
responded by stating that “all parolees retain certain basic rights and liberty interests,
and enjoy a measure of constitutional protection against the arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable curtailment of ‘the core values of unqualified liberty.’”128
Although the Taylor court struck down the blanket application of residency
restrictions, the court emphasized that the Department of Corrections retained
authority to impose special restrictions on sex offenders, including residency
restrictions, so long as they were supported by the “particularized circumstance of
each individual case.”129
B. Massachusetts’ Approach to Residency Restrictions
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts also recently struck down the blanket
use of residency restrictions for sex offenders. 130 In City of Lynn, a municipality
121

Id.

122

Id.

123

Id. at 879.

124

Id. at 881 (discussing how registered sex offenders could be cut off from access to public
transportation, medical care, and other social services to which they are entitled, as well as
reasonable opportunities for employment due to restrictions).
125

Id. (providing residency restrictions increased incidences of homelessness, making it
harder to supervise and track offenders, which undermines the governmental objective to keep
the public safe); see also Cornwell, supra note 45, at 32 (“That one-third of the individuals
subject to Jessica’s Law in San Diego County were homeless was especially troubling to the
court, since it has severely compromised law enforcement’s ability to effectively monitor and
supervise that population.”).
126

Taylor, 343 P.3d at 879.

127

Id. at 878.

128

Id. at 882 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).

129

Taylor, 343 P.3d at 882.

130

Doe v. City of Lynn, 36 N.E.3d 18, 24-25 (Mass. 2015) (discussing a city ordinance that
imposed a 1,000 feet residency restriction against level two and three sex offenders,
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enacted an ordinance for sex offenders to “to add location restrictions to such
offenders where the State law is silent.”131 The court noted that “[t]he geographical
and temporal reach of the ordinance effectively prohibit[ed] all level two and three
sex offenders from establishing residence, or even spending the night in a shelter, in
ninety-five per cent of the residential properties in Lynn.” 132
The court in City of Lynn determined that the residency restriction imposed by
the city ordinance was unconstitutional because it was “inconsistent with the
comprehensive [state] statutory scheme governing the oversight of convicted sex
offenders. . . .”133 The state had already established a registration scheme with a very
narrow residency restriction that only applied to level-three sex offenders.134 The
court held that not only did the state establish a comprehensive statutory scheme, but
also, the ordinance would negatively affect the ability to monitor and track sex
offenders.135 This allowed the court to infer that the legislature of Massachusetts
“intended to preclude local regulation of sex offender residency options.” 136
The court then noted that even the narrow residency restriction imposed on level
three offenders would be unconstitutional without an individualized assessment of
the offender to determine whether the offender posed a risk to the public. 137 The
court in City of Lynn recognized arguments against the blanket use of residency
restrictions as well.138 The court proclaimed that “the days are long since past when
whole communities of persons, such [as] Native Americans and JapaneseAmericans[,] may be lawfully banished from our midst.” 139 The court also pointed
out that imposing residency restrictions disrupts the home situation of the sex
offender, a factor that has been recognized to reduce recidivism rates. 140 The court

prohibiting the offenders from living within the restricted area of public, private, and church
schools).
131

Id. at 20 (“The stated purpose of the ordinance is to ‘reduce the potential risk of harm to
children of the community by impacting the ability of registered sex offenders to be in contact
with unsuspecting children in locations that are primarily designed for use by, or are primarily
used by children.’”).
132

Id. (discussing that a sex offender would have difficulty in moving to a nearby town or
city, as many of them had similar restrictions on sex offenders).
133

Id. at 19.

134

Id. at 24 (emphasizing that, for level three sex offenders, the residency restriction, with the
aim of protecting a vulnerable population, only precluded them from living in rest homes or
other long-term care facilities) (“Registration information for level one sex offenders is not
provided to the public, information for level two and level three offenders is available to the
public by request or on the Internet, and information for level three offenders may be
disseminated actively to the public.”).
135

Id. at 23.

136

Id.

137

Id. at 24-25 (citing Doe v. Police Comm’r of Bos., 951 N.E.2d 337 (Mass. 2011)).

138

City of Lynn, 36 N.E.3d at 25.

139

Id.

140

Id. at 26.
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held that this conflicted with the legislature’s goal of protecting the public from sex
offenders.141
V. OHIO’S CURRENT APPROACH ON RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS
A. Ohio Statutes Regulating Sex Offenders
Ohio’s legislature has passed laws to regulate sex offenders in the state. 142 In
reference to the registration and notification requirements for sex offenders, 143 Ohio
law establishes a tiered system to categorize sex offenders depending on the crime
underlying the conviction.144 Ohio also imposes residency restrictions on sex
offenders, and they are imposed regardless of which tier the sex offender has been
assigned.145 This means that Ohio imposes residency restrictions “on all registered

141

Id.

142

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01-.99 (West 2016); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108,
1110, 1117-18 (Ohio 2011)); see also Schubert, supra note 27, at 277 (“S.B. 10 was enacted
to amend, among other chapters, chapter 2950 of the Ohio Revised Code in order to bring
Ohio sex offender registration laws into compliance with the [Adam Walsh Act]”). Ohio’s
current scheme of laws regarding sex offenders is based on the federal Adam Walsh Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 16901-16962 (2006).
143

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.04(A)(1)(a) (“[O]ffender[s] shall register personally with the
sheriff, or the sheriff’s designee, of the county in which the offender was convicted of or
pleaded guilty to the sexually oriented offense.”); see also Schubert, supra note 27, at 288
(“That notification includes the offender’s: (1) name; (2) address; (3) offense and conviction;
(4) classification; and (5) photograph.”).
144

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01. Tier I offenses are: importuning, unlawful sexual
conduct with a minor, voyeurism, sexual imposition, gross sexual imposition, illegal use of a
minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, and child enticement. Id. at § 2950.01(E).
Tier II offenses are: compelling prostitution, pandering obscenity involving a minor, illegal
use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance (different subsections from Tier I
offense), child endangering, kidnapping with sexual motivation, unlawful sexual conduct with
a minor, and any sexual offense that occurs after the offender has been classified as a Tier I
sex offender. Id. at § 2950.01(F). Tier III offenses are: rape, sexual battery, aggravated murder
with sexual motivation, unlawful death or termination of pregnancy as a result of committing
or attempting to commit a felony with sexual motivation, kidnapping of minor to engage in
sexual activity, kidnapping of minor not by parent, gross sexual imposition (if victim under
13), felonious assault with sexual motivation, and any sexual offense that occurs after the
offender has been classified as a Tier II sex offender. Id. at § 2950.01(G); see also Schubert,
supra note 27, at 287 (“[T]he duration and frequency of the registration of sex offenders is
determined by the tier and is as follows: (1) Tier I sex offenders must register every year for
fifteen years; (2) Tier II offenders must register every 180 days for twenty-five years; (3) Tier
III offenders must register every ninety days for life.”).
145

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034 (“No person who has been convicted of, is convicted of,
has pleaded guilty to, or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented
offense shall establish a residency or occupy residential premises within one thousand feet of
any school premises or preschool or child day-care premises.”); see also Schubert, supra note
27, at 288 (“In addition, landlords are permitted to terminate rental agreements and seek
injunctive relief in an effort to oust the offender from the residence.”).
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sex offenders regardless of the crime’s severity, whether or not the victim was a
minor, or if the offender presents a future risk of danger. 146
In enacting these laws against sex offenders, the Ohio legislature found that
“[s]ex offenders and child-victim offenders pose a risk of engaging in further
sexually abusive behavior even after being released from imprisonment, a prison
term, or other confinement or detention, and protection of members of the public
from sex offenders and child-victim offenders is a paramount governmental
interest.”147 It also found that “[a] person who is found to be a sex offender or a
child-victim offender has a reduced expectation of privacy because of the public’s
interest in public safety and in the effective operation of government.” 148
B. Retroactivity and Residency Restrictions
Ohio’s residency restrictions, first enacted in 2003 149 and amended in 2007,150 are
not to be applied retroactively.151 In Hyle v. Porter, the Supreme Court of Ohio held
that Ohio’s initial residency restrictions statute, formerly Ohio Revised Code Section
2950.031, was only prospective in nature.152 In determining whether the residency
restrictions could apply retroactively, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “because
R.C. 2950.031 was not expressly made retroactive, it does not apply to an offender
who bought his home and committed his offense before the effective date of the
statute.”153
Subsequently, an Ohio appellate court further defined how courts are to
determine whether the residency restrictions are being applied retroactively to sex
offenders.154 The court first noted that the only difference between the current statute
enacting residency restrictions, Section 2950.034, and the statute that preceded it,
Section 2950.031, was the current statute’s restriction from preschools and daycare
centers.155 The court discussed the analysis used to determine what types of conduct
146

Troia, supra note 11; see also Schubert, supra note 27, at 288 (“One of the most significant
differences between R.C. chapter 2950, as amended by H.B. 180, and R.C. chapter 2950, as
amended by S.B. 10, is that H.B. 180 amendments allowed judges to use discretion when
determining a sex offender’s classification. Therefore, under H.B. 180 amendments, judges
were able to determine the sex offender’s risk of recidivism, and then apply the appropriate
sex offender registration requirements necessary to protect the community from the sex
offender. The enactment of S.B. 10 erased this discretion and now requires all current sex
offenders to be classified or re-classified under one of the three tiers, which are based solely
on the offense committed.”).
147

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.02(A)(2).

148

Id. at § 2950.02(A)(5).

149

OHIO REV. CODE § 2950.031 (2007), invalidated by State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio
2010).
150

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.034.

151

Hyle v. Porter, 882 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ohio 2008).

152

Id. at 902.

153

Id. at 904.

154

See O’Brien v. Phillips, 43 N.E.3d 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).

155

Id. at 5.
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would trigger the retroactive application of the residency restrictions. 156 Based on
that analysis, the court held that it was the conviction for the sex offense that triggers
the application of the residency restrictions; therefore, as long as the conviction
occurs after the effective date of the statute enacting the residency restrictions, the
statute is not operating retroactively. 157
C. Ex Post Facto Considerations for Residency Restrictions
The holding of another Ohio case furthers the notion that the amendments to
Ohio’s statutory treatment of sex offenders cannot be applied retroactively.158 The
State v. Williams court held that Ohio’s statutory scheme regulating sex offenders is
punitive after S.B. 10.159 In pertinent part, the court held:
Sex offenders are no longer allowed to challenge their classifications as
sex offenders because classification is automatic depending on the
offense. Judges no longer review the sex-offender classification. In
general, sex offenders are required to register more often and for a longer
period of time. They are required to register in person and in several
different places. . . . Furthermore, all the registration requirements apply
without regard to the future dangerousness of the sex offender. Instead,
registration requirements and other requirements are based solely on the
fact of a conviction. Based on these significant changes to the statutory
scheme governing sex offenders, we are no longer convinced that R.C.
Chapter 2950 is remedial, even though some elements of it remain
remedial. We conclude that as to a sex offender whose crime was
committed prior to the enactment of S.B. 10, the act ‘imposes new or
additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities to a past transaction’ .
. . and “creates new burdens, new duties, new obligations, or new
liabilities not existing at the time.”160
This classification is important because
when a law is deemed to be punitive, substantive and procedural
constitutional protections must flow from that determination. One
constitutional limitation on criminal legislation is the Ex Post Facto
Clause, which prohibits retroactive application of a law that “inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed.”161
Therefore, if Ohio’s statutes regarding sex offenders were applied retroactively,
there would potentially be Ex Post Facto ramifications following the State v.
Williams holding.

156

Id. at 6.

157

Id.

158

See State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011).

159

Id. at 1112.

160

Id. at 1113.

161

Carpenter, supra note 61, at 1105.
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D. Due Process and Residency Restrictions
Ohio courts have held that residency restrictions imposed on sex offenders are
constitutional under the Due Process Clause. 162 In O’Brien v. Hill, the court held that
the residency restrictions do not infringe on a fundamental right of sex offenders. 163
The court stated Ohio courts have consistently rejected arguments that Ohio’s
residency restrictions infringe on the right of sex offenders to use and enjoy
property.164
The appellate court then quoted its holding in State ex rel. O’Brien v. Heimlich:
[A]lthough former R.C. 2950.031(A) prohibits appellant from residing
within 1,000 feet of a school premises, the statute does not preclude him
from owning, renting, or leasing a home within 1,000 feet of a school
premises. Sexually oriented offenders are simply precluded from living
within 1,000 feet of a school premises. Accordingly, the statute does not
impair appellant’s substantive property rights as enumerated in the Ohio
Constitution.165
The court also proclaimed that the freedom to live wherever a person wants is not
fundamental, despite its importance. 166
Because the residency restrictions did not violate a fundamental right, the court
used a rational basis review to determine whether the restrictions were
constitutional.167 Using this level of review, the court stated that the statute imposing
residency restrictions was rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in
protecting children.168
V. A TAILORED APPROACH FOR OHIO TO EFFECTUATE ITS OVERALL GOAL OF
PROTECTING CHILDREN
Ohio should shift from its current system of implementing residency restrictions
on a blanket basis to the case-by-case system suggested in California and
Massachusetts.169 Various scholars support this suggestion as well.170 Instead of
imposing residency restrictions on anyone “who has been convicted of, is convicted
of, has plead guilty to, or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense or a child162

See, e.g., O’Brien v. Hill, 965 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).

163

Id.

164

Id.

165

Id. (quoting O’Brien v. Heimlich, 2009-Ohio-1550, at ¶ 31 (10th Dist.)).

166

Hill, 965 N.E.2d at 1053.

167

Id.

168

Id. (citing O’Brien, 2009-Ohio-1550).

169

See In re Taylor, 343 P.3d 867 (Cal. 2015); see also Doe v. City of Lynn, 36 N.E.3d 18
(Mass. 2015).
170

See Cornwell, supra note 45, at 1; see also Zgoba, supra note 34 (“Rather than a generic
approach to dealing with sex offenders, criminal justice practices should fundamentally rely
on the individualized, empirically tested risk assessments conducted in most states. This
tailored approach offers a reasonable and justifiable alternative to the broad policies currently
in existence.”).
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victim oriented offense,”171 the judges in Ohio would have the ability to impose
residency restrictions after first having an individualized assessment completed to
determine his or her risk to the public.172 After completing the assessment, sex
offenders who are deemed to have a high probability of reoffending would be
eligible for residency restrictions, and possibly other restrictions, imposed upon
them.173 Sex offenders who have a low probability of reoffending will have
appropriate restrictions placed on them that will not impede on the treatment and
support they will need to rehabilitate.
Changing Ohio’s current system of imposing residency restrictions to a case-bycase approach will address some of the flaws of the system imposing the restrictions
on a blanket basis. First, by conducting an individual assessment to make a
determination on the dangerousness of the sex offender to the public, there would be
evidence to support the imposition of the residency restrictions on that particular sex
offender. This individualized approached would eliminate the argument that the
residency restrictions are an “unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive” action of the
state.174
Second, by targeting the use of residency restrictions to those who are deemed a
high-risk of danger to the public, the burden on law enforcement would decrease.
The current system requires law enforcement to expend resources on sex offenders
who are unlikely to reoffend. This inefficient use of resources is wasteful.175 The
case-by-case system would allow law enforcement resources to be focused on
monitoring and enforcing the residency restrictions on the sex offenders who may
actually pose a risk to children, further effectuating the stated goals of the statute. As
noted in his review of In re Taylor, Cornwell described the inability of law
enforcement officials to effectively monitor and supervise sex offenders, thereby
putting the public at risk, as one of the main reasons that the court held that the
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See Schubert, supra note 27, at 284-85. Ohio utilized individualized assessments to
determine the dangerousness of sex offenders prior to 2003. The factors used to determine the
dangerousness of the sex offenders were
(1) the offender’s age; (2) any prior criminal record; (3) the age of the victims; (4) the
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whether any prior convictions or pleas led to any available programs for sex
offenders; (7) mental illness or mental disability; (8) the nature of the conduct with the
victim and evidence of a pattern of abuse; (9) whether the offender acted with cruelty
or threatened cruelty; (10) any additional behavior that contributed to the conduct.
Id.
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See, e.g., Mustaine, supra note 27, at 174. Sex offenders at high risk for sexually
recidivating with child victims may be managed effectively with residential boundary
restrictions, while young adult offenders with slightly younger (but still underage) consensual
victims are likely to need other types of restrictions/treatment to keep them law abiding. In
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community. Id.
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statute in California was not rationally related to protecting children from sex
offenders.176
Third, reducing the number of sex offenders subject to residency restrictions
diminishes the concentration of sex offenders in those designated areas with limited
housing options.177 Arguably, it would also help mitigate homelessness in this
particular population because there would be less competition for the available
housing options in the limited areas outside of the restricted zones for sex offenders.
Ameliorating homelessness would not only increase the quality of life for sex
offenders, but also would allow law enforcement officers to better monitor and
supervise sex offenders, making the public at large safer.
Fourth, changing Ohio’s system of imposing residency restrictions to a case-bycase system would address the arguments that the current system of imposing the
restrictions is excessive.178 The inclusion of an individualized risk assessment would
limit the focus of the residency restrictions to those who pose the greatest risk to
public safety.179
Finally, changing Ohio’s system of imposing residency restrictions to a case-bycase system would place Ohio in accord with the current shift across the nation in
managing these types of restrictions for sex offenders. 180 Courts are recognizing that
an assessment of the risk that is posed by each sex offender is needed, 181 as not all
sex offenders pose the same risk to children. 182 Changing Ohio’s system would give
its courts the freedom to make an individualized determination of the risk that a sex
offender poses.
The blanket use of residency restrictions is one of the reasons for the
ineffectiveness in reducing recidivism rates. 183 By imposing residency restrictions on
all persons convicted of sex offenses without making a determination of the
offender’s likelihood to reoffend, some states, including Ohio,184 are burdening some
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individuals unlikely to reoffend.185 As a result, Ohio wastes valuable resources
enforcing residency restrictions on individuals who are unlikely to benefit from
them. 186
VI. CONCLUSION
Although protecting the safety and well-being of children is an important goal,187
laws that are enacted to accomplish this goal should be tailored so that they are most
effective. On its face, imposing blanket residency restrictions to prevent sexual
offenders from living in close proximity to children appears to promote the goal of
protecting children. However, in practice, the residency restrictions impose great
burdens, such as higher risks of homelessness and limited access to social services,188
on convicted sex offenders without accomplishing the goal of protecting children.189
Research shows residency restrictions have failed to reduce recidivism rates.190
A well-known scholar and author on the topic of sex offenders proclaimed, “We
are not being smart. We are just flailing about. We need to enact laws based on the
latest headline case. Politicians under pressure pass symbolic [residency] laws . . .
that are not based on any solid research.”191
Ohio should amend its current law imposing residency restrictions on a blanket
basis for those convicted of sex offenses and utilize individual assessments to
determine whether an offender is likely to reoffend. This shift would give Ohio’s
judges greater discretion to retain residency restrictions for the state’s more
dangerous offenders. As described above, statutes imposing residency restrictions on
sex offenders began with benevolence but have overreached due to unfounded fears
and misconceptions. Despite substantial research demonstrating the ineffectiveness
of their current application, lawmakers, especially at the local level, continue to
promote their use in a misguided effort to protect the children in their communities.
A change needs to be made.

185

Troia, supra note 11, at 358.

186

Zgoba, supra note 34, at 396.

187

OHIO REV. CODE § 2950.02 (A)(2) (“Sex offenders and child-victim offenders pose a risk
of engaging in further sexually abusive behavior even after being released from imprisonment,
a prison term, or other confinement or detention, and protection of members of the public
from sex offenders and child-victim offenders is a paramount governmental interest.”).
188

Zgoba, supra note 34, at 395.

189

See Tewksbury, Policy Implications, supra note 87.

190

See id.

191

Troia, supra note 11, at 343-44 (quoting Ian Demsky, Sex Offenders Live Near Many
Schools, Day Cares, THE TENNESSEAN, July 18, 2005, at A1).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017

23

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss4/10

24

